//! Integration test for the dangling-symlink write-escape fix.
//!
//! Runs against the library's public API so it compiles/executes independently
//! of unrelated in-crate test fixtures. Reproduces the concrete escape an
//! approved `ln -s` could otherwise open: a symlink whose target does not exist
//! yet (so `exists()` is false and `canonicalize()` fails) must still be
//! rejected when it points outside the per-session sandbox, instead of being
//! treated as a brand-new in-sandbox path that a Write would follow out.

#![cfg(unix)]

use boosapi::services::agent_workbench::sandbox::{check_tool_paths, validate_path_within_cwd};
use serde_json::json;
use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
use std::path::PathBuf;

fn tmp_sandbox() -> PathBuf {
    let base = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("agent_it_sb_{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple()));
    std::fs::create_dir_all(&base).unwrap();
    base.canonicalize().unwrap()
}

#[test]
fn dangling_symlink_to_absolute_target_is_rejected() {
    let sb = tmp_sandbox();
    symlink("/etc/cron.d/pwn_it", sb.join("evil")).unwrap();
    let res = validate_path_within_cwd("evil", &sb);
    assert!(res.is_err(), "expected rejection, got {res:?}");
}

#[test]
fn dangling_relative_symlink_escape_is_rejected() {
    let sb = tmp_sandbox();
    symlink("../../escape_it", sb.join("evil")).unwrap();
    assert!(validate_path_within_cwd("evil", &sb).is_err());
}

#[test]
fn write_tool_through_dangling_symlink_is_blocked() {
    let sb = tmp_sandbox();
    symlink("/etc/cron.d/pwn_it2", sb.join("evil")).unwrap();
    let input = json!({ "path": "evil", "content": "* * * * * root sh -c id" });
    assert!(check_tool_paths("write", &input, &sb).is_err());
}

#[test]
fn write_through_intermediate_dangling_symlink_dir_is_blocked() {
    let sb = tmp_sandbox();
    symlink("/etc/nonexistent_it_dir", sb.join("evildir")).unwrap();
    let input = json!({ "path": "evildir/pwn", "content": "x" });
    assert!(check_tool_paths("write", &input, &sb).is_err());
}

#[test]
fn dangling_symlink_pointing_inside_sandbox_is_allowed() {
    let sb = tmp_sandbox();
    symlink(sb.join("future_file"), sb.join("ok_link")).unwrap();
    assert!(validate_path_within_cwd("ok_link", &sb).is_ok());
}

#[test]
fn ordinary_new_file_still_allowed() {
    let sb = tmp_sandbox();
    assert!(validate_path_within_cwd("notes/today.md", &sb).is_ok());
}