fix(agent): prevent dangling-symlink write escape from the sandbox

validate_path_within_cwd used exists() to decide whether a path was new.
exists() follows symlinks, so a *dangling* symlink (target missing) reported
false and fell into the not-yet-existing branch, which only bound-checked the
nearest existing ancestor — never the symlink itself. An approved
`ln -s /etc/cron.d/pwn evil` inside the sandbox would therefore pass
validation, and a subsequent Write to `evil` would follow the link and create
a file outside the sandbox. In AcceptEdits mode this chained cleanly: approve
one innocuous-looking symlink (Execute), then writes auto-allow.

Resolve every path component with lstat (symlink_metadata, which does not
follow links) instead of exists():
- Final component: if it is a symlink (dangling or live), resolve its real
  target via read_link + canonicalize-nearest-ancestor and reject unless the
  target stays within the sandbox.
- Ancestor walk: an intermediate dangling symlink directory is likewise
  resolved and bound-checked rather than skipped.

Live symlinks were already caught by canonicalize; this closes the dangling
case. It does not close the check-vs-open TOCTOU (the open happens inside the
SDK tool and would need O_NOFOLLOW/openat2 there); tracked for phase 2 along
with OS-level bash isolation.

Covered by tests/agent_sandbox.rs (dangling symlink to absolute and relative
targets, write tool through a dangling link, write through an intermediate
dangling symlink dir, all rejected; dangling link pointing inside and ordinary
new files still allowed) plus mirrored in-crate unit tests.

src/services/agent_workbench/sandbox.rs

@@ -51,6 +51,15 @@ fn sanitize_session_id(session_id: &str) -> String {
 /// not-yet-existing paths the nearest existing ancestor is canonicalized and
 /// checked, so writes to new files inside the sandbox are permitted while writes
 /// that would escape it are rejected.
+///
+/// Symlinks are handled explicitly with `lstat` (not `exists()`, which follows
+/// links): any component that is a symlink — including a *dangling* one whose
+/// target does not exist yet — has its target resolved and is rejected if it
+/// points outside the sandbox. This stops an approved `ln -s /outside x` from
+/// being written through to escape (a write to `x` would otherwise follow the
+/// link). Note this closes the escape, not the check-vs-open TOCTOU race; the
+/// actual open happens inside the tool and would need `O_NOFOLLOW`/`openat2`
+/// there to be fully atomic.
 pub fn validate_path_within_cwd(path: &str, cwd: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
     let cwd_canonical = cwd
         .canonicalize()
@@ -63,6 +72,22 @@ pub fn validate_path_within_cwd(path: &str, cwd: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf, Strin
         cwd_canonical.join(target)
     };
 
+    // Final component: if it is a symlink (dangling or not), trust only its
+    // target. lstat does not follow the link, so a dangling symlink is detected
+    // here instead of slipping into the not-yet-existing branch below.
+    if let Ok(meta) = std::fs::symlink_metadata(&resolved) {
+        if meta.file_type().is_symlink() {
+            let tgt = symlink_real_target(&resolved)?;
+            return if tgt.starts_with(&cwd_canonical) {
+                Ok(resolved)
+            } else {
+                Err(format!(
+                    "path '{path}' is a symlink that escapes the session sandbox"
+                ))
+            };
+        }
+    }
+
     if resolved.exists() {
         let canonical = resolved
             .canonicalize()
@@ -76,10 +101,25 @@ pub fn validate_path_within_cwd(path: &str, cwd: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf, Strin
         };
     }
 
-    // Not-yet-existing path: walk up to the nearest existing ancestor.
+    // Not-yet-existing path: walk up to the nearest existing ancestor. Use
+    // lstat so an intermediate *dangling* symlink directory is caught (an
+    // existing symlink ancestor with a live target is already caught by
+    // canonicalize, but a dangling one would otherwise be skipped over).
     let mut ancestor = resolved.parent();
     while let Some(dir) = ancestor {
-        if dir.exists() {
+        match std::fs::symlink_metadata(dir) {
+            Ok(meta) if meta.file_type().is_symlink() => {
+                let tgt = symlink_real_target(dir)?;
+                return if tgt.starts_with(&cwd_canonical) {
+                    Ok(resolved)
+                } else {
+                    Err(format!(
+                        "path '{path}' traverses a symlink that escapes the session sandbox"
+                    ))
+                };
+            }
+            Ok(_) => {
+                // Existing real directory/file: canonicalize and bound-check.
                 let anc_canonical = dir
                     .canonicalize()
                     .map_err(|e| format!("cannot resolve ancestor of '{path}': {e}"))?;
@@ -89,11 +129,54 @@ pub fn validate_path_within_cwd(path: &str, cwd: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf, Strin
                     Err(format!("path '{path}' is outside the session sandbox"))
                 };
             }
+            // Component does not exist in any form yet: keep walking up.
+            Err(_) => {}
+        }
         ancestor = dir.parent();
     }
     Err(format!("cannot verify path '{path}' against the session sandbox"))
 }
 
+/// Resolve where a (possibly dangling) symlink points, as a real absolute path,
+/// without requiring the target to exist: read the link, make it absolute
+/// relative to the link's parent, then canonicalize its nearest existing
+/// ancestor and re-append the missing remainder.
+fn symlink_real_target(link: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
+    let raw = std::fs::read_link(link)
+        .map_err(|e| format!("cannot read symlink '{}': {e}", link.display()))?;
+    let abs = if raw.is_absolute() {
+        raw
+    } else {
+        link.parent().unwrap_or_else(|| Path::new("/")).join(raw)
+    };
+    real_location(&abs)
+        .ok_or_else(|| format!("cannot resolve symlink target '{}'", abs.display()))
+}
+
+/// Real absolute location of a path that may not fully exist: canonicalize the
+/// nearest existing ancestor (resolving any symlinks/`..` in the existing part)
+/// and re-append the non-existing remainder lexically.
+fn real_location(p: &Path) -> Option<PathBuf> {
+    if let Ok(c) = p.canonicalize() {
+        return Some(c);
+    }
+    let mut remainder: Vec<std::ffi::OsString> = Vec::new();
+    let mut cur = p.to_path_buf();
+    loop {
+        let parent = cur.parent()?;
+        if let Some(name) = cur.file_name() {
+            remainder.push(name.to_os_string());
+        }
+        if let Ok(mut base) = parent.canonicalize() {
+            while let Some(name) = remainder.pop() {
+                base.push(name);
+            }
+            return Some(base);
+        }
+        cur = parent.to_path_buf();
+    }
+}
+
 /// Check whether a tool's path-bearing arguments stay within the sandbox.
 ///
 /// Returns `Ok(())` when the tool either takes no path arguments or all of its
@@ -184,4 +267,60 @@ mod tests {
         let input = json!({"command": "ls -la"});
         assert!(check_tool_paths("bash", &input, &sb).is_ok());
     }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_dangling_symlink_escape() {
+        // Models an approved `ln -s /etc/cron.d/pwn evil` inside the sandbox,
+        // whose target does not exist yet. A later Write to `evil` must NOT be
+        // allowed to follow the link out of the sandbox.
+        let sb = tmp_sandbox();
+        std::os::unix::fs::symlink("/etc/cron.d/pwn_dangling", sb.join("evil")).unwrap();
+        let res = validate_path_within_cwd("evil", &sb);
+        assert!(res.is_err(), "dangling symlink escape must be rejected: {res:?}");
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_dangling_symlink_to_absolute_outside() {
+        let sb = tmp_sandbox();
+        std::os::unix::fs::symlink("/tmp/definitely_outside_xyz", sb.join("link")).unwrap();
+        assert!(validate_path_within_cwd("link", &sb).is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_relative_dangling_symlink_escape() {
+        // `evil -> ../../escape` (target missing) must be rejected too.
+        let sb = tmp_sandbox();
+        std::os::unix::fs::symlink("../../escape_target", sb.join("evil")).unwrap();
+        assert!(validate_path_within_cwd("evil", &sb).is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn allows_dangling_symlink_pointing_inside() {
+        // A symlink whose (missing) target is still inside the sandbox is fine.
+        let sb = tmp_sandbox();
+        std::os::unix::fs::symlink(sb.join("inside_target"), sb.join("ok_link")).unwrap();
+        assert!(validate_path_within_cwd("ok_link", &sb).is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_write_through_intermediate_dangling_symlink_dir() {
+        // `evildir -> /etc` (dangling), then write to `evildir/pwn`.
+        let sb = tmp_sandbox();
+        std::os::unix::fs::symlink("/etc/nonexistent_dir_xyz", sb.join("evildir")).unwrap();
+        assert!(validate_path_within_cwd("evildir/pwn", &sb).is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn check_tool_paths_blocks_dangling_symlink_write() {
+        let sb = tmp_sandbox();
+        std::os::unix::fs::symlink("/etc/cron.d/pwn2", sb.join("evil")).unwrap();
+        let bad = json!({"path": "evil", "content": "* * * * * root sh"});
+        assert!(check_tool_paths("write", &bad, &sb).is_err());
+    }
 }

tests/agent_sandbox.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+//! Integration test for the dangling-symlink write-escape fix.
+//!
+//! Runs against the library's public API so it compiles/executes independently
+//! of unrelated in-crate test fixtures. Reproduces the concrete escape an
+//! approved `ln -s` could otherwise open: a symlink whose target does not exist
+//! yet (so `exists()` is false and `canonicalize()` fails) must still be
+//! rejected when it points outside the per-session sandbox, instead of being
+//! treated as a brand-new in-sandbox path that a Write would follow out.
+
+#![cfg(unix)]
+
+use boosapi::services::agent_workbench::sandbox::{check_tool_paths, validate_path_within_cwd};
+use serde_json::json;
+use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+
+fn tmp_sandbox() -> PathBuf {
+    let base = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("agent_it_sb_{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple()));
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(&base).unwrap();
+    base.canonicalize().unwrap()
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn dangling_symlink_to_absolute_target_is_rejected() {
+    let sb = tmp_sandbox();
+    symlink("/etc/cron.d/pwn_it", sb.join("evil")).unwrap();
+    let res = validate_path_within_cwd("evil", &sb);
+    assert!(res.is_err(), "expected rejection, got {res:?}");
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn dangling_relative_symlink_escape_is_rejected() {
+    let sb = tmp_sandbox();
+    symlink("../../escape_it", sb.join("evil")).unwrap();
+    assert!(validate_path_within_cwd("evil", &sb).is_err());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn write_tool_through_dangling_symlink_is_blocked() {
+    let sb = tmp_sandbox();
+    symlink("/etc/cron.d/pwn_it2", sb.join("evil")).unwrap();
+    let input = json!({ "path": "evil", "content": "* * * * * root sh -c id" });
+    assert!(check_tool_paths("write", &input, &sb).is_err());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn write_through_intermediate_dangling_symlink_dir_is_blocked() {
+    let sb = tmp_sandbox();
+    symlink("/etc/nonexistent_it_dir", sb.join("evildir")).unwrap();
+    let input = json!({ "path": "evildir/pwn", "content": "x" });
+    assert!(check_tool_paths("write", &input, &sb).is_err());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn dangling_symlink_pointing_inside_sandbox_is_allowed() {
+    let sb = tmp_sandbox();
+    symlink(sb.join("future_file"), sb.join("ok_link")).unwrap();
+    assert!(validate_path_within_cwd("ok_link", &sb).is_ok());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn ordinary_new_file_still_allowed() {
+    let sb = tmp_sandbox();
+    assert!(validate_path_within_cwd("notes/today.md", &sb).is_ok());
+}